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Abstract: The paper is composed of three basic parts. In the introduction are discussed the 
successive stages of cooperation of the states of the European Union within the III pillar of the EU 
– from its inception (the European Union Treaty, signed in Maastricht on the 7th of February 1992) 
to the Treaty of Lisbon (signed on the 13th of December 2007). In the second part is described the 
most significant legal instrument of the III pillar, implementing the harmonisation of the criminal 
law of the member states, that is the framework decisions. In the third part are presented examples 
of the implementation of chosen framework decisions in Polish law – the Framework Decision of 
the Council of 2002/475/JHA of 13th of June 2002 on combating terrorism and the Framework 
Decision of the Council 2002/629/JHA of the 19th of July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings. Certainly the choice is not casual. The author endeavours to present two extreme models of 
implementing of framework decisions: a method of implementation consisting in transfer of legal 
rules, with the aim of inserting created norms into the Polish legal order and the contrary one of 
rewriting the content of the implemented framework decision without any reflection. 
 
 
IMPLEMENTACJA DECYZJI RAMOWYCH DOTYCZĄCYCH PRAWA KARNEGO 
MATERIALNEGO DO POLSKIEGO PORZĄDKU PRAWNEGO – ZAGADNIENIA 
WYBRANE 
 
Abstrakt: Referat składa się z trzech zasadniczych części. We wstępie omówione zostały kolejne 
etapy współpracy państw Unii Europejskiej w ramach III filara UE – od jego powstania (Traktat  
o Unii Europejskiej, podpisany w Maastricht 7 lutego 1992 r.) do traktatu z Lizbony (podpisany 13 
grudnia 2007 r.). W części drugiej dokonano charakterystyki najistotniejszego instrumentu 
prawnego III filara, słuŜącego zbliŜaniu prawa karnego państw członkowskich, czyli decyzji 
ramowej. W części trzeciej zaprezentowane zostały przykłady implementacji wybranych decyzji 
ramowych do polskiego porządku prawnego – decyzji ramowej Rady 2002/475/WSiSW z dnia 13 
czerwca 2002 r. w sprawie zwalczania terroryzmu oraz decyzji ramowej Rady 2002/629/WSiSW  
z dnia 19 lipca 2002 r. w sprawie zwalczania handlu ludźmi. Ich wybór jest nieprzypadkowy. Autor 
na ich przykładzie starał się zaprezentować dwie przeciwstawne metody implementacji: metodę 
polegającą na transpozycji norm prawnych i nadaniu przepisom form pasujących do polskiego 
porządku prawnego oraz jej przeciwieństwo – „przepisanie" treści postanowień implementowanej 
decyzji.  
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Introduction 
 
The Member States of the European Community have for a long time avoided taking any 
action to harmonise criminal law as the state monopoly in punishing criminals is 
undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of state sovereignty. The arguments for 
maintaining the status quo were provided by founding treaties, in which there were no 
grounds to undertake any action in this matter. A turning point came on the 7th of 
February 1992 when the European Union Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty of 
Maastricht, was signed. Its so-called third pillar included cooperation in criminal justice 
and home affairs.  
Cooperation of states within the framework of the third pillar was on an 
intergovernmental and not a community basis. That means that the Member States settled 
the areas of common interests in which their actions were coordinated. As a result, the 
Member States themselves made decisions in this matter and transferred them to their 
legislation. (Zielińska 2004, 186). As a consequence there was a lack of homogeneity 
with the community model of decision making (independently by the Council of the EU) 
and greatly limited competences of the community institutions, for instance legislative 
initiative regarding cooperation in criminal issues rested only on the Member States, no 
powers were provided for the European Court of Justice. In the third pillar other forms 
and instruments of cooperation were also applied: unanimously adopted by the Council of 
the EU common standpoints (defining precisely the procedure in specific issues), joint 
actions and international conventions, which the Member States concluded within the EU 
(Grzelak 2008, 41). The first two “were only a set of good intentions and rules” 
(Karsznicki 2009, 71-72). Within the framework of the third pillar the only binding legal 
acts were conventions prepared by the Council of the EU and “recommended to be 
implemented” by the Member States.  
The solutions adopted in the third pillar were subject to criticism because of 
their ineffectiveness. Because of that work on reform started, the effect of which was the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on the 2nd of October 1997, hereinafter referred to as the 
Treaty of Amsterdam). Primarily the scope of cooperation within the third pillar was 
extended (see art. 29-31of the Treaty of Maastricht). Recognition of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) as a one of EU objectives was important (art. 2 of the Treaty 
of Maastricht). It was evidence of no longer considering this sphere only as an object of 
“common interests” of the Member States and starting to consider it as the policy of the 
whole EU (Grzelak 2008, 45). Simultaneously so-called policies related to free 
movement of persons became policies of the entire Community. In connection with that 
within the framework of the first pillar were included: visas, asylum, immigration 
policies, judicial cooperation in civil matters and mutual administrative assistance in 
customs matters. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation 
remained in the third pillar. As a result, AFSJ became unbalanced since it was composed 
of policies of the first pillar to which the community system was applied and policies of 
the intergovernmental third pillar. Furthermore with the aquis communitare were 
included the Schengen Agreement of the14th of June 1985 on the gradual abolition of 
checks at their common borders and the Convention of the 19th of June 1985 
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implementing the Schengen Agreement. For the issues thus regulated, some of their 
provisions became a part of the first pillar, while others were included in the third pillar.  
As a consequence of the changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
institutions of the Community obtained certain competences in the third pillar. The 
commission was given parity of legislative initiative with the Member States. Limited 
powers were submitted to the European Court of Justice: controlling framework decisions 
and other decisions (art. 35 par. 6 of the Treaty of Maastricht), and also responding to 
prejudicial questions (but the Member States were at liberty to decide whether to 
recognise the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in this field). Furthermore, the 
Council of the UE was obliged to consult the European Parliament before approving 
statutes (with the exception of common standpoints). The most important change was the 
introduction of the new legal instrument – the framework decision – intended according 
to art. 34 par. 2 point B of the Treaty of Maastricht for the approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States. Other legal instruments of the former third pillar were 
common standpoints and decisions, general statutes adopted by the Council “for any 
other purpose consistent with the objectives of this title, excluding any approximation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States. These decisions shall be binding and shall 
not entail direct effect” (art. 34 par. 2 point c). By virtue of these decisions several 
specialised institutions were created, such as Eurojust (Council Decision 2002/187/JHA 
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime). In accord 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam joint actions were renounced. Obviously some, previously 
promulgated, are still valid, but most were replaced by framework decisions or decisions, 
for instance: the Joint action 98/733/JHA on making it a criminal offence to participate in 
a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union was replaced by the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime. 
The Treaty of Nice (signed on the 26th of February 2001, hereinafter the Treaty 
of Nice) introduced no important modifications related to the subject discussed in this 
article. Whereas far-reaching modifications were proposed in the Treaty establishing  
a Constitution for Europe, signed on the 29th of October 2004, which aimed at total 
abolition of the EU pillar structure. The main legal instruments were intended to be 
European statutes and European framework decisions, which were equivalents of today’s 
regulations and directives. Since it was not approved, the treaty of Lisbon was signed on 
13th December 2007, hereinafter the Treaty of Lisbon, apparently as a compromise 
solution. It was formulated as amendments to the Treaty of Maastricht (hereinafter the 
treaty with amendments is referred to as the EU Treaty) and to the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community. Simultaneously, the name of the latter was changed to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU).  
Currently, we are in the transitional period of five years until the Treaty of 
Lisbon becomes effective. It is regulated in Protocol Title 7 (No 36) to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the UE on Transitional Provisions. According to its art. 9 the legal 
consequences of acts adopted within the third pillar on the basis of the Treaty of 
Maastricht prior to the validity of the Treaty of Lisbon remain valid until they are 
repealed, annulled, or amended, for the period not exceeding five years (art. 10 of the 
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Protocol). The first abrogated framework decision was the Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings replaced by the Directive 
2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its 
victims). The same refers to the conventions concluded between the Member States on 
the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht. During this period the Commission was not entitled 
to the powers resulting from the provision of art. 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (former art. 226 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community) concerning 
statutes on police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is executed according to art. 35 of the Treaty 
of Maastricht (providing facultative jurisdiction, presently abrogated). If the statute is 
amended though, the above reservations shall not be valid.  
 
Characteristics of framework decisions  
 
Framework decisions are binding for the Member States in regard to the result, which 
must be reached but national institutions are unrestricted in choosing forms and measures 
for that purpose. Thus they are similar to directives – they oblige the Member States to 
implement their provisions in national legislation within a fixed period. What 
differentiates them from directives is that they have no direct executive effect (cannot be 
a separate source of rights and duties of individual persons). Furthermore, it was not 
decided how to exact their implementation from the Member States. That was primarily 
caused by the fact that the European Court of Justice had no competence in the third 
pillar and as a consequence of the lack of procedure analogous to that provided in the first 
pillar according to art. 226 and 227 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(currently art. 258 and 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). On the basis of 
the procedure the Commission (art. 226 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, currently art. 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) or a Member 
State (art. 227 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, currently art. 259 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) may initiate proceedings before the Court of 
Justice against state which in the fixed time has not implemented (or implemented 
incompletely or incorrectly) a directive to its legal order. Still, judicial decisions of the 
European Court of Justice obliged the Member States to ensure the effectiveness of 
framework decisions; results included the principle of loyalty to the EU and obligation of 
interpretation of domestic legal acts in favour of the law of the European Community, 
which was highlighted by the Court in the case C 105/03 Pupino (Biernat 2005, 201-204, 
216-217; Jasiński 2005, 105). 
By framework decisions the Member States were bound to penalise such acts as 
for instance: euro counterfeiting (the Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in 
connection with the introduction of the euro), terrorism (the Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism), trafficking in human beings (the Council 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings), drug 
trafficking (the Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit 
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drug trafficking) and attacks against information systems (the Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems). 
Similarly as in the case of directives, two extreme models of implementing of 
framework decisions and their variants may be identified. The first consists of literal 
rewriting of a framework decision. Sometimes it is the only possible mean of transfer – 
this is the case of framework decisions regarding procedural issues, for instance the 
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant (hereinafter 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA). Generally, this method has one advantage because 
of which is promoted by institutions of the EU – verification of implementation 
correctness presents no difficulty. Nevertheless it should be remembered that framework 
decisions intend to harmonise of legal orders of the Member States not unify them. 
Therefore their transfer should take into account the specific character of a legal system 
in a particular state. Thus it should be assumed that necessarily it consists of 
implementation of legal rules not provisions. It is essential especially for framework 
decisions regarding substantive criminal law, which compels penalisation of defined 
behaviour. Their provisions are very general, their contents indicate the facts of a case 
whereas it is the responsibility of national legislatures to create legal rules to criminalise 
undesirable conduct (see more in: Grzelak 2008, 120-123).  
Implementation of provisions of framework decisions should be achieved in the 
greater part with a statute, especially when provisions of a framework decision refer to 
so-called statutory matter. In the case of discordance between a framework decision and a 
constitution it may be necessitate amending the constitution (in many countries, including 
Poland that was the effect of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA). In some cases it is 
sufficient to change the legal interpretation of rules of a national law (such a situation 
occurred for instance in Italy with regard to the Pupino case).  
Certainly it is possible that legal rules of a Member State are consistent with 
provisions of a framework decision. In such case there is no need of implementation of 
the provisions. 
In conformity to the subject of the present article, the next part focuses on the 
problem of implementation within the Polish legal order of framework decisions obliging 
the Member States to introduce defined types of prohibited acts to their legal systems. 
Because of the limited volume of the present study only the question of 
implementation of two framework decisions will be discussed: the Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism and the Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings. Certainly the choice is not 
casual. In the case of the first one deals with a method of implementation consisting in 
transfer of legal rules, with the aim of inserting created norms into the Polish legal order. 
The second case, to the contrary, shows the model of rewriting the content of the 
implemented framework decision without any reflection.  
 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of the 13th of June 2002 on combating terrorism 
 
The Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of the 13th of June 2002 on combating 
terrorism (hereinafter referred to as the Framework Decision 2002/475) obliges the 
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Member States primarily to introduce a unified definition of a “terrorist offence”. All the 
more since in international law “terrorism” has no universally agreed, legally binding, 
criminal law definition. In some UN documents the following descriptive definition is 
used: "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes” which are “in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify 
them” (United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 
annex to UN General Assembly resolution 49/60 Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism of December 9, 1994, UN Doc. A/Res/60/49). 
The definition of a terrorist offence is included in art. 1 par. 1 of the Framework 
Decision 2002/475 and consists of two elements: the subjective and the objective. The 
offence shall be deemed a terrorist offence first of all when corresponding to at least one 
of subjective prerequisites included in the first part of the definition regarding the 
intention of offender, that is it has to be committed with the intention of: 
(i) seriously intimidating a population, or 
(ii) unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or 
refrain from performing any act, or 
(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. 
 
Secondly, it must comply with the objective criterion, that is inclusion in the 
finite catalogue included in the second part of the definition (among others: attacks upon 
a person’s life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage 
taking, causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, seizure of 
aircraft, manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or nuclear, biological or chemical weapons etc.) or to threat to commit any of 
the acts listed.   
Whereas in art. 3 of the Framework Decision 2002/475 the Member States are 
obliged to penalise “offences linked to terrorist activities”, consisting of activities, which 
are not terrorist activities themselves but may be undertaken with a view to their 
commission (for instance: inciting terrorist offences, recruitment and terrorist training, 
forgery of administrative document etc.)  
According to art. 2 of the Framework Decision 2002/475directing a terrorist 
group and participating in the activities of a terrorist group shall be punishable. 
According to the provision of art. 2 par. 1 of the Framework Decision 2002/475, a 
terrorist group is a structured group of more than two persons established over a period of 
time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. The “structured group” is a group 
that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does 
not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or 
a developed structure.   
The provisions of the Framework Decisions 2002/475 were implemented in the 
Polish legal order with the Act of the 16th of April 2004 on amendment of the Penal Code 
Act and some other acts. 
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The Polish legislator did not decide on literal transfer of the definition of  
a terrorist offence. A new, more concise definition was created. The highlighted issue 
was the criterion of the intention in the act of an offender, which was indicated in the 
provision as in the Framework Decision 2002/475 art. 1 par. 1. Alternatively, as the aim 
of a criminal act are regarded:  
(i) seriously intimidating a large number of people, 
(ii) compelling the Government of the Republic of Poland or the Government of 
another country or international organisation to perform or refrain from 
performing defined acts,  
(iii) seriously destabilising the political system or economy of the Republic of Poland, 
of another country or an international organisation. 
 
The second element of the definition, which is included in art. 115 § 20 of the 
Penal Code is constructed differently from the original in the Framework Decision 
2002/475. The catalogued offences, which when committed with any of the intentions 
listed in the first part of the definition are regarded as offences of a terrorist character are 
replaced by the formal criterion. An offence to be regarded as an offence of a terrorist 
character must be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty with at least a statutory 
maximum of 5 years. Therefore the provision does not create delictum sui generis but 
regards as an offence of a terrorist character every offence (every crime and serious 
misdemeanour punished under penalty of deprivation of liberty with at least 5 years of 
statutory maximum) committed with any of the intentions listed in the first part of 
definition (Giezek 2007, 772). In accord with provisions of the Framework Decision 
2002/475, as a terrorist offence is also regarded threatening to commit any such act (art. 
115 § 20 in fine) (Wąsek 2005, 874). 
It is worth mentioning that the result described in the definition is not crucial for 
committing an offence considered as an offence of a terrorist character. It is important 
that an offender acts with the aim described and the offence itself is punished under 
penalty of deprivation of liberty with at least 5 years of statutory maximum (Compare 
with Giezek 2007, 775; Górniok 2004, 8; Michalska-Warias 2009, 221; Sońta 2005, 17-18).  
The number of offences, which are subject to penalty of deprivation of liberty 
with at least a statutory maximum of 5 years, is high. Many of them may not be 
considered as offences of a terrorist character since it is even difficult to imagine how 
with their commission an offender may achieve the result described in the definition, 
such as seriously intimidating a large number of people, compelling the public authorities 
or international organisation to perform defined acts or seriously destabilising the 
economy of the Republic of Poland, another country or an international organisation. The 
most striking examples of such offences are the offences against the family and custody 
(for instance bigamy, the offence of ignoring the obligation to pay alimony or inducing 
minors to drink) (Giezek 2007, 773. Compare with Jasiński, Zielińska 2005, 528).  
The solution applied, to refrain from enumerating the list of offences, which 
when committed with any of the aims indicated become offences of a terrorist character – 
as in the Framework Decision 2002/475 – is advantageous because it does not create an 
expanded and casuistic definition (Compare with Majewski 2004, 1244). Furthermore, as 
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is stressed by Agnieszka Grzelak, literally “rewriting” the content of art. 1 of the Framework 
Decision 2002/475 would be ineffective since every prohibited act indicated there in the 
Polish penal system may be qualified on the basis of different legal rules of the Penal Code, 
cumulatively coinciding in predictable facts of a case (Grzelak 2008, 158).  
The statutory maximum of 5 years of deprivation of liberty arouses justified 
doubts. It may have the effect that not all types of the offences described in the 
framework decision shall be considered as terrorist offences on the grounds of the penal 
code. As an example may be cited the culpable preparation to commit an offence of 
hostage taking, punished under penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of 3 years (art. 
252 § 3 of the Polish Penal Code, hereinafter PPC) or punishable threat (art. 190 PPC see 
Budyn-Kulik, Kozłowska-Kalisz 2010, 258. More in Jasiński, Zielińska 2005, 527).  
Taking into consideration the above, some scholars believe that if the criterion 
of the intention of the offender’s act is the most important issue and determines the 
terrorist character of the offence, the condition of statutory maximum should be annulled. 
This is especially relevant when considering that the idea of distinguishing a terrorist 
offence consists among others in more severe of punishment for acts of a terrorist 
character, even those seemingly less serious (Compare with Giezek 2007, 775). 
In accord with provisions of the Framework Decision 2002/475 the regulation 
providing aggravation of penal responsibility for an offence of a terrorist character was 
introduced into the General Part of the Penal Code (art. 5 par. 2). According to the 
content of amended art. 65 § 1 PPC for offenders committing such acts, the provision of 
art. 64 § 2 PPC is applied. In compliance with that the rules regarding sentencing, penalty 
measures and means connected with an offender being on probation, provided for 
offenders described in art. 64 § 2 PPC (that is “multi-recidivists”) are applied also to 
offenders of acts of a terrorist character. That means, among others, that the court 
(obligatorily) imposes a penalty of deprivation of liberty provided for the offence 
committed harsher than the statutory minimum and may impose it up to the statutory 
maximum increased by a half. Such an offender may apply for conditional release not 
before having served ¾ of a sentence. 
In connection with implementation of the Framework Decision 2002/475 the 
amendment to the provision of art. 110 § 1 PPC regarding jurisdiction was needed. It 
needed modification to enable application of Polish penal rules to a foreign national, who 
committed an offence of a terrorist character in Poland. It was necessary to amend art. 
258 PPC as well, which penalises participation in a group or organization intending to 
commit terrorist offences or fiscal offences. The provision of § 2 was modified creating 
the qualified type of this crime, providing harsher punishment (deprivation of liberty 
from 6 months to 8 years) when the group is armed – presently it refers to organisation or 
group with the intention of committing offences of a terrorist character. At the same time 
art. 258 PPC was supplemented with § 4 penalising founding or directing a group or 
organisation of a terrorist character and that was considered to be a crime. Whereas, 
according to art. 65 § 2 PPC to the offender of the offences described in art. 258 PPC 
provisions regarding multi-recidivists are applied, that is referring to an offender 
described in art. 64 § 2 PPC, except for severer punishment provided in the provision.  
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I think it may be generally assumed that the framework decision was 
implemented in the proper manner to the Polish legal order. Rightly it was decided not to 
mechanically rewrite its provisions but it was properly adapted to the Polish Penal Code. 
Due to that excessive casuistry and possible incoherence of the penal system were 
avoided (Compare with Grzelak 2008, 161. Differently Jasiński, Zielińska 2005, 527). It 
is worth considering though departing from fixing the lowest level of a statutory 
maximum of a penalty as a condition for regarding a prohibited act as an offence of a 
terrorist character. 
 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings 
 
The second framework decision, which I wish to focus on is the Council Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA of the 19th of July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings (hereinafter Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA), which obliges the Member 
States to take appropriate action for the purpose of preventing human trafficking. 
Likewise the term “terrorism”, trafficking in human being has no universally agreed, 
international definition. The authors of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No 197) in its explanatory report stated that 
“Trafficking in human beings, with the entrapment of its victims, is the modern form of 
the old worldwide slave trade. It treats human beings as a commodity to be bought and 
sold, and to be put to forced labour, usually in the sex industry but also, for example, in 
the agricultural sector, declared or undeclared sweatshops, for a pittance or nothing at all” 
(Explanatory Report to Council of Europe Convention No 197 on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings). Similarly, in the Explanatory Memorandum in Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA, “Trafficking in human beings” is described as “considered one 
of the most serious crimes worldwide, a gross violation of human rights, a modern form 
of slavery, and an extremely profitable business for organised crime. It consists of the 
recruitment, transfer or receipt of persons, carried out with coercive, deceptive or abusive 
means, for the purpose of exploitation including sexual or labour exploitation, forced 
labour, domestic servitude or other forms of exploitation including the removal of 
organs”.  
In the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, which is the subject of present study, this 
prohibited act is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, 
subsequent reception of a person, including exchange or transfer of control over that 
person, where: 
(i) use is made of coercion, force or threat, including abduction, or  
(ii) use is made of deceit or fraud, or  
(iii) there is an abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability, which is such, that 
the person has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse 
involved, or  
(iv) payments or benefits are given or received to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person”. 
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The purpose of the offender’s activity is exploitation of the victim’s labour or 
services, including “at least forced or compulsory labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery or servitude, or for the purpose of exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation including in pornography” (art. 1 par. 1 in 
fine). 
In paragraph 2 of the article is made the reservation that the consent of a victim 
to the exploitation is irrelevant, where any of the means set forth in article 1 paragraph  
1 have been used. Regarding children (that is any person below 18 years of age – art. 1 
par. 4 of the framework decision) the same solution as in the acts of international law was 
applied, when the conduct described in par. 1 involves a child it shall be an offence, even 
if none of the means set forth in the provision have been used.  
The provisions of the framework decision were implemented in the Polish legal 
order with the Penal Code Amendment Act of the 20th of May 2010, to the Police Act, to 
the act on provisions introducing the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Proceedings. 
With the amendment, the previous provision penalising human trafficking (that is art. 253 
§ 1 PPC) was replaced by the provision of art. 189a (placed in Chapter XXIII “Offences 
against freedom”), which has a similar content. One, important modification was 
introduced: the verb “to practise” (in the provision of art. 253 § PPC practising human 
trafficking was mentioned) was replaced by the verb “to commit”, which in my opinion 
allows the conclusion that even a single act of an offender may be regarded as human 
trafficking. Other important novum is the punishability of preparation for the offence.  
The most relevant modification is the definition of human trafficking adopted in 
art 115 § 22 PPC. According to that human trafficking is the act consisting of actual 
actions of recruitment, transfer, harbouring and reception of an even one person executed 
with use of the defined means. The legislator enumerated them: violence or unlawful 
threat, abduction, deceit, misleading or taking advantage of a mistake or incapability of 
correct comprehension of action undertaken, an abuse of a relation of dependency, taking 
advantage of critical position or a state of helplessness, giving or receiving payments or 
personal benefits or their promise given to a person exercising tutelage or controlling 
another person. It is without doubt a confined catalogue since the legislator did not use an 
open clause enabling considering mentioned conduct only as examples (Kozłowska-
Kalisz 2010, 263). What is more, the definition specifies that an offender must act for the 
purpose of exploitation of a person, who is a “victim of human trafficking”. The meaning 
of exploitation was specified also by giving examples (the expression “particularly” tells 
us that): exploitation of prostitution, pornography or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, begging, slavery or other forms of exploitation humiliating 
human dignity or for the purpose of obtaining cells, tissues or organs against legal rules. 
Furthermore, the clause was added that the above-mentioned conduct, when referring to  
a minor, is human trafficking even when the methods or measures listed in the act were 
not used. The consent of an injured person certainly is irrelevant for occurrence of human 
trafficking.  
According to the above mentioned act, there is no doubt that the concept of 
human trafficking shall be understood as actual actions, and it is clear that to indicate the 
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offence only one action of the offender is needed (“one transaction”), referring to one 
person. Whereas, the requirement of acting for the “purpose of exploitation” is the 
requirement of result oriented intent (dolus directus coloratus). 
The amendment to the Penal Code conveyed is not sufficiently considered. 
Without doubt few correct solutions were introduced. As such should be regarded 
transferring the provision, which previously penalised human trafficking (art. 253 § 1 
PPC) to the Chapter XXIII, its modification by replacing the word “to practise” by the 
word “to commit”, introducing the offence of preparation for the offence and abrogation 
of art. 204 § 4 PPC, since the facts of a case, which are penalised by this provision are 
covered in full by the provision of art. 189a § 1 (that is the previous art. 253 § 1 PPC) that 
determines the definition of “human trafficking” applied. The definition itself arouses 
reservations. There is no doubt that it consists in the framework decision rewriting. 
Therefore it is expanded and extremely casuistic, which may cause limitation of the scope 
of culpability. That is why it is essential to support the view of Włodzimierz Wróbel 
(Wróbel, 2010) and Andrzej Sakowicz (Sakowicz, 2010), who in the opinions to the draft 
of amendment prepared by them suggest introducing the expression “in particular”, 
before the forms of human trafficking described and making it a list of examples. At the 
same time it would enable removing the clause regarding minors (the last phrase of the 
definition). Włodzimierz Wróbel shows that it might reduce possible problems in the 
future, since the clause existing in the present form may cause penalisation of conduct, 
which does not threaten personal dignity (for instance adoption procedures) (Wróbel, 
2010). I think that the definition should exclude means used for committing the offence 
of human trafficking as well, since when the offender uses none of them it might prevent 
prosecution (Hudzik, Paprzycki, 2009). Due to that change it would become synthetic 
and “concordant with the Polish tradition of creating synthetic provisions of penal law” 
(Bojarski, Górniok 2010, 615).  
In similar respects it is not advisable to introduce subjective attributes by 
including the requirement of the purposive intent – each time indicating the direction of 
the offender’s action may prevent application of the provision of art 189a in reference to 
some facts of a case (Hudzik, Paprzycki, 2009; Sakowicz, 2010). Whereas it will 
certainly hamper fast and effective prevention of the dangerous and increasingly frequent 
phenomenon of human trafficking (Radoniewicz 2011, 153-154).  
It seems that the above-discussed defects of the new regulations, created as  
a result of implementation of the new Framework Decision 2002/629, prove convincingly 
that transposition of its provisions was not appropriately conducted. Copying the 
definition included there, as presented above, was a mistaken solution, the consequences 
of which are regulations, which certainly will be not be effective for prevention of human 
trafficking. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this study, the Treaty of Lisbon formally abolished 
the three-pillar structure of the European Union. But it may not be forgotten that during 
the current 5-year transition period, the provisions of framework decisions are valid until 
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repeal, annulment or amendment. Furthermore, it seems that remarks made in the present 
study regarding implementation of the framework decisions regulating the issues of 
substantive criminal law may be referred to the directives, which will intercept their role. 
Since with regard for the differences between particular national legal orders and the 
unwillingness of the Member States to devolve on the EU institutions too strong an 
interference in this matter of law, the provisions of the directive regarding this issue will 
be, at least in the immediate future, formulated in the same way as the provisions of 
framework decisions, that is as generally as possible. As a result, the optimal 
implementation should be analogous to that applied to the Framework Decision 2002/475 
on combating terrorism, consisting in implementation of the legal rules rather than 
unconsidered rewriting their contents, as was the case of the Framework Decision 
2002/629 on combating trafficking in human beings. The thesis is confirmed by the way 
in which the provisions regarding substantial criminal law were formulated in the 
Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims. 
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